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I. INTRODUCTION
Courts seek to interpret ambiguities in insurance policies, and
applicable statutory language, in a manner that maintains the
1
insured’s rights. Recently, the Minnesota Supreme Court had an
opportunity to interpret ambiguities in Minnesota’s fire insurance
† University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, B.A. English 1999; William Mitchell
College of Law, J.D. anticipated May 2003.
1. See generally Mark C. Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations Revisited, 5 CONN. INS.
L.J. 107, 115-16 (1998) (stating “the time-honored ambiguity principle of
insurance policy interpretation states when a policy term is ambiguous the court
should adopt the interpretation that favors the insured”); see infra note 103
(discussing the long-standing judicial policy disfavoring forfeiture clauses in
insurance contracts).
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2

statute, and clarify the function of a proof of loss clause in an
3
insurance policy. In Nathe Bros., Inc. v. American National Fire
4
Insurance Co., the court considered a proof of loss clause in a
5
policy, which used the statutory language in Minnesota’s Standard
6
Fire Insurance Policy. The court correctly ruled that the proof of
7
loss clause is a condition subsequent and failure to submit the
proof of loss within the specified time requirement should not
8
necessarily bar recovery. This decision maintained the plaintiff’s
rights under the policy and clarified the function of the proof of
9
loss clause in Minnesota.
This note examines the history of courts reviewing insurance
10
policies, focusing primarily on proof of loss clauses. This note also
explores the history of Minnesota’s Standard Fire Insurance
11
Policy. Part III of this note details the supreme court’s holding in
12
13
Nathe while Part IV analyzes the ruling’s implications. The note
concludes that the Minnesota Supreme Court’s correct ruling
14
maintained the insured’s rights under the policy. The court
concluded that failing to submit a sworn proof of loss within “60
15
days,” as required by the Minnesota Standard Fire Insurance
16
Policy, will not necessarily bar recovery on the policy. This
conclusion maintained the plaintiff’s rights under the policy and
clarified the Minnesota Standard Fire Insurance Policy by finding
the proof of loss requirement, absent specific policy language, is a
17
condition subsequent.

2. MINN. STAT. § 65A.01 (2000).
3. Nathe Bros., Inc. v. Am. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co., 615 N.W.2d 341 (Minn. 2000).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. MINN. STAT. § 65A.01 (2000).
7. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 289 (7th ed. 1999) (defining condition subsequent
as “an event the existence of which, by agreement of the parties, discharges a duty
of performance that has arisen”).
8. Nathe, 615 N.W.2d at 348-49.
9. Id.
10. See infra Part II.A.
11. See infra Part II.B-C.
12. See infra Part III.A-B.
13. See infra Part IV.A-B.
14. See infra Part V.
15. MINN. STAT. § 65A.01 (2000).
16. Nathe, 615 N.W.2d at 348.
17. Id.
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II. HISTORY OF PROOF OF LOSS TIME REQUIREMENT
A. Courts Reviewing Insurance Policies
18

Insurance policies follow the basic principles of contracts.
19
Most insurance policies are adhesion contracts; therefore courts
resolve ambiguities in favor of the insured to avoid interpreting
20
them in a manner that will forfeit rights under the policy.
However, courts will find a forfeiture in an insurance contract if the
language is unambiguous and a forfeiture is clearly the intent of
21
both parties. Interpretation of insurance policy and statutory
22
language presents questions of law that courts in every state review
23
de novo.
B. Common Law
At common law, Minnesota courts held specific policy
language will expressly make the time requirement to submit the
24
proof of loss a condition precedent would bar recovery by the
25
insured if that time was not met. However, courts held that even
18. 1 GEORGE J. COUCH ET AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE § 1:4 (2d rev. ed. 1984)
(stating “insurance is a matter of contract and parties are bound by the terms
thereof, the same as parties to other contracts”).
19. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 318-19 (7th ed. 1999) (defining adhesion contracts
as “a standard-form contract prepared by one party, to b0e signed by the party in a
weaker position”).
20. See infra note 103 (discussing the long-standing judicial policy disfavoring
forfeiture clauses in insurance policies).
21. Northwestern Tel. Exch. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 86 Minn. 467, 469, 90
N.W. 1110, 1111 (1902) (holding “no notice was given until more than a year after
the accident, which was not in compliance with the terms of the contract,
therefore the appellant is released from liability”); Raska v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins.
Co. of Mich., 314 N.W.2d 440, 440 (Mich. 1982) (stating “any clause in a policy is
valid so long as it is clear and unambiguous”).
22. See generally Richard H.W. Maloy, ‘Standards of Review’ – Just a Tip of the
Icicle, 77 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 603, 614-16 (2000) (stating federal courts use a de
novo review when interpreting insurance contracts and state courts use a de novo
review when interpreting a statute or written documents).
23. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 94 (7th ed. 1999) (defining appeal de novo as “an
appeal in which the appellate court uses the trial court’s record but reviews the
evidence and law without deference to the trial court’s rulings”).
24. Id. at 289 (defining condition precedent as “an act or event, other than a
lapse of time, that must exist or occur before a duty to perform something
promised arises”).
25. Mason v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 82 Minn. 336, 339, 85 N.W. 13,
15 (1901); Shapire v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 61 Minn. 135, 136, 63 N.W.
614, 614 (1895); Shapiro v. W. Home Ins. Co., 51 Minn. 239, 240, 53 N.W. 463, 463
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though specific language made the proof of loss provision a
condition precedent, the insurer can waive the provision through
26
its actions. Courts noted where the policy does not include
specific language making that time requirement a condition
precedent to the liability of the insurance company, then the time
27
28
to submit a proof of loss is not “of the essence” of the contract.
C. Minnesota Standard Fire Insurance Policy of 1895
In 1895, the Minnesota legislature enacted the Minnesota
29
Standard Fire Insurance Policy which provided a standard form
that contained required terms and conditions for policies of fire
insurance. The form contained a provision requiring that a sworn
30
proof of loss must be submitted to the insurer “forthwith” after
the loss, which courts interpreted as a condition subsequent to
31
recovery on the policy. Courts stated that the “forthwith” clause
32
should be interpreted to mean a reasonable time, which left some
uncertainty to what constitutes a reasonable time.

(1892); Mosness v. German-Am. Ins. Co. of N.Y., 50 Minn. 341, 346, 52 N.W. 932,
933 (1892); Bowlin v. Hekla Fire Ins. Co., 36 Minn. 433, 434, 31 N.W. 859, 859
(1887). See infra note 87 (discussing recent Minnesota court decisions holding
specific policy language constituted a condition precedent; further discussing
similar holdings from other jurisdictions).
26. Shapire, 61 Minn. at 136, 63 N.W. at 614 (holding failure to submit a proof
of loss as required by the policy was a bar to recovery absent any waiver by the
insurer); First Nat’l Bank of Devil’s Lake v. Am. Cent. Ins. Co. of St. Louis, 58
Minn. 492, 497, 60 N.W. 345, 345 (1894); Bromberg v. Minn. Fire Ass’n of
Minneapolis, 45 Minn. 318, 321, 47 N.W. 975, 976 (1891).
27. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1115 (7th ed. 1999) (defining of the essence as “so
important that if the requirement is not met, the promisor will be held to have
breached the contract and a rescission by the promisee will be justified”).
28. See generally Mason, 82 Minn. at 339, 85 N.W. at 15 (stating “holdings that
proof of loss provisions was condition precedent at common law was due to
express provisions in the policies”).
29. See Act of Apr. 25, 1895, ch. 175, § 53, 1895 Minn. Laws 392 (codified in
MINN. STAT. § 65A.01 (2000)).
30. Id.
31. Boston Ins. Co. v. A.H. Jacobson Co., 226 Minn. 479, 483, 33 N.W.2d 602,
605 (1948) (stating “while the policy requires the statement of loss to be rendered
‘forthwith,’ it does not provide for a forfeiture of the insured’s rights if he fails to
comply within the time limited”); Mason, 82 Minn. at 340, 85 N.W. at 15 (holding
the term “forthwith” created a condition subsequent).
32. Farrell v. Neb. Indem. Co., 183 Minn. 65, 67, 235 N.W. 612, 613 (1931)
(holding a reasonable time will vary in each case depending on the facts and
circumstances); Mason, 82 Minn. at 339, 85 N.W. at 15 (stating “‘forthwith’ should
be construed to mean within a reasonable time”).
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In Mason v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., the
Minnesota Supreme Court noted that the time which proof of loss
34
is required is not “of the essence” of the contract. In this case, St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. had issued a fire insurance policy in the
form of the Minnesota Standard Fire Insurance Policy covering a
35
steam yacht. The yacht was totally destroyed by fire and Mason
36
submitted a proof of loss to St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. The
trial court charged the jury that Mason had failed to show
compliance with a “forthwith” submission of a proof of loss,
however such failure was not material and it did not invalidate the
37
policy. The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the ruling in favor
of Mason and stated “unless the policy provides a forfeiture, or
makes the service of proofs of loss within the time specified therein
a condition precedent to the liability of the company, the time
within such proofs are required to be furnished is not of the
38
essence of the contract.” The court noted that this policy
“contains no provision making the service of proofs of loss within
39
the time specified fatal to the rights of the insured.” The court
noted that the legislature may add express language to the
Minnesota Standard Fire Insurance Policy to make the failure to
comply with the timeliness requirement of submitting the proof of
40
loss a condition precedent.
The Mason case clarified the proof of loss clause in the
Minnesota Standard Fire Insurance Policy of 1895 by finding that
absent specific policy language, the proof of loss clause is “not of
41
the essence of the contract.”
D. Amendments to the Minnesota Standard Fire Insurance Policy
In 1955, the Minnesota Legislature amended the standard fire
42
insurance policy by adding a maintenance of suit clause to the

33. 82 Minn. 336, 85 N.W. 13 (1901).
34. Id. at 339, 85 N.W. at 14.
35. Id. at 337, 85 N.W. at 14.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 338, 85 N.W. at 14.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 340, 85 N.W. at 15.
41. Id. at 338, 85 N.W. at 14.
42. See Act of Apr. 18, 1955, ch. 482, § 1, 1955 Minn. Laws 751 (codified in
MINN. STAT. § 65A.01 (2000)).
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43

two-year limitation on actions and changing the timeliness
44
requirement for the submission of proof of loss to “60 days.” The
Minnesota Supreme Court has held the addition of the
maintenance of suit clause did not make strict compliance with all
45
the terms of the policy a condition precedent to recovery.
46
Recently, in Leamington Co., v. Nonprofits’ Insurance Ass’n, the
Minnesota Supreme Court noted that the insured’s failure to
47
submit its proof of loss within sixty days does not bar recovery. In
this case, Nonprofits’ Insurance Association (NIA) issued an
insurance policy to Leamington covering a building in
48
Minneapolis. Leamington discovered water damage to the ceilings
49
and walls of the building caused from thawing snow or ice. NIA
sent a reservation of rights to Leamington and also requested a
50
sworn proof of loss and enclosed a proof of loss form in the letter.
Leamington completed and signed the sworn proof of loss from
51
and mailed it to NIA seventy-seven days after NIA’s request. After
receiving no response from NIA, Leamington commenced an
52
action alleging that NIA breached its policy. The court of appeals
upheld the trial court’s summary judgment ruling that
Leamington’s failure to submit a sworn proof of loss effected a
53
complete bar to any recovery. Minnesota’s Supreme Court
overruled the court of appeals and stated “Leamington’s delay in
54
submitting its proof of loss does not bar its recovery in this case.”
The court held that the proof of loss clause under Minnesota’s
Standard Fire Insurance Policy is not a condition precedent to
55
recovery on a policy.

43. Id. at subd. 3.
44. Id.
45. McCullough v. Travelers Cos., 424 N.W.2d 542, 545 (Minn. 1988)
(holding insured’s failure to submit to an examination under oath prior to
bringing suit on the policy did not require dismissal of the suit).
46. 615 N.W.2d 349 (Minn. 2000).
47. Id. at 353-54.
48. Id. at 351.
49. Id. at 352.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 353.
54. Id. at 354.
55. Id. This case was decided on the same day as Nathe Bros., Inc. v. Am. Nat’l
Fire Ins. Co., 615 N.W.2d 341 (Minn. 2000) and cites to Nathe Bros. in its opinion.
Id.
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III. THE NATHE DECISION
A. The Facts
On November 6, 1996, Nathe Brothers, Inc. (“Nathe
Brothers”) purchased a policy of property hazard insurance from
American National Fire Insurance Company (“American
56
National”) for a restaurant. Ten days after Nathe Brothers
purchased the insurance policy, a rain and ice storm substantially
57
damaged the restaurant’s roof and flooded its banquet hall. Nathe
58
Brothers immediately notified American National of the damages.
On December 4, 1996, American National sent an adjuster to
59
survey the damage. Thirteen days later, American National sent a
60
reservation of rights letter to Nathe Brothers.
Nathe Brothers sent a letter to American National and
61
attached a damage and repair estimate of $362,700. American
National responded by stating that based on policy exclusions,
62
coverage would be limited to $10,000. On January 30, 1997,
American National informed Nathe Brothers that if it disagreed
with the adjustment it must submit a sworn proof of loss statement
63
with supporting documentation within sixty days of that date.
Enclosed in that letter was the proof of loss form along with a
64
check for $8,949.42 ($10,000 less the policy’s deductible).
Nathe Brothers returned American National’s check, along
65
with an incomplete proof of loss form. American National
responded by stating that the proof of loss form had not been
properly executed and that it was required for Nathe Brothers to
66
maintain the claim.
56. Nathe Bros., Inc. v. Am. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co., 615 N.W.2d 341, 343 (Minn.
2000). Nathe Brothers purchased the commercial insurance policy for the 49 Club
(the restaurant and bar), which is located in Lino Lakes Minnesota. Id.
57. Id. American National and Nathe Brothers disagreed on whether the roof
actually collapsed, as Nathe Brothers claimed, or whether the roof merely sagged,
as American National claimed. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. Nathe Brothers’ letter was sent on December 24, 1996. Id.
62. Id. American National’s response was sent on January 22, 1997. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. Nathe Brothers claim to have attached another copy of its damage and
repair estimate to this letter, which was sent on February 14, 1997. Id.
66. Id. American National disputes receiving the damage and repair estimate
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On April 24, 1997, eighty-four days after the initial request,
67
Nathe Brothers returned a properly executed proof of loss form.
American National returned the form on May 30, 1997, rejecting it
68
as incomplete and containing errors.
Nathe Brothers sued American National alleging it had
69
breached the insurance policy. American National moved for
summary judgment on the grounds that Nathe Brothers’ suit was
barred because it did not provide the sworn proof of loss within
70
sixty days of American National’s request. The trial court granted
71
American National’s motion for summary judgment.
72
Nathe Brothers appealed the district court’s ruling. The
73
court of appeals ruled that under American National’s policy and
74
Minnesota’s Standard Fire Insurance Policy, the timely submission
75
of a sworn proof of loss is a condition precedent to recovery. The
appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision by holding that
Nathe Brothers’ failure to submit a proof of loss within sixty days
76
barred recovery. The court of appeals reasoned that the policy
and statute compelled the conclusion that the insured, as a
precondition to suing for benefits, must provide signed and sworn
77
proof of loss within sixty days of the insurer’s request. The court
stated, “the insured may not bring suit unless all the policy
provisions are complied with and thus acts as a condition
78
precedent to recovery.” The court of appeals affirmed the district
court’s ruling by holding “Nathe failed to satisfy a condition
precedent to recovery under its standard commercial fire insurance
policy when it failed to provide a sworn proof of loss within 60 days

in Nathe Brothers’ February 14 letter. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 343-44. American National’s policy called for the submission of a
proof of loss form within sixty days of its initial request. Id. at 348.
74. MINN. STAT. § 65A.01 (2000). Minnesota’s Standard Fire Insurance Policy
calls for the submission of the proof of loss within sixty days after the damage or
loss. Id. at subd. 3.
75. Nathe Bros., Inc. v. Am. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co., 597 N.W.2d 587, 590-91
(Minn. Ct. App. 1999).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 589.
78. Id. at 590.
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79

B. The Court’s Analysis
80

The supreme court in Nathe reversed the appeals court. It
concluded that failure to submit a sworn proof of loss in a timely
81
manner will not necessarily bar recovery on a policy. The court
noted that an insurance company may include specific language in
its policy stating that failure to submit a sworn proof of loss is a
82
condition precedent to the liability of the insurer. The court
noted this finding is consistent with past rulings that insurance
policies should be construed in favor of the insured and disfavor
83
forfeiture clauses in insurance contracts.
The court reached this conclusion by reasoning that the
Minnesota Standard Fire Insurance Policy of 1895 used the
language “forthwith” to describe the time in which the sworn proof
84
of loss must be submitted. Past cases have interpreted the
85
“forthwith” time requirement as a condition subsequent because
86
it affected rights that have already accrued. This holding was
distinguished from other cases, where the policy contained specific
language changing the time of submission to a condition
87
precedent.
79. Id. at 591.
80. Nathe Bros., Inc. v. Am. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co., 615 N.W.2d 341, 348-49
(Minn. 2000).
81. Id. at 348.
82. Id.
83. Orren v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 288 Minn. 225, 228, 179 N.W.2d 166, 169
(1970) (stating “courts will resolve ambiguous policy language against the insurer,
avoiding an interpretation which would forfeit the insured’s rights”); Weum v.
Mut. Benefit Health & Accident Ass’n, Omaha, 237 Minn. 89, 105, 54 N.W.2d 20,
29 (1952) (stating “the supreme court will avoid an interpretation of an insurance
policy which would forfeit rights”); see also infra note 103 (discussing similar
holdings in other jurisdictions).
84. See Act of Apr. 25, 1895, ch. 175, § 53, 1895 Minn. Laws 392 (codified at
MINN. STAT. § 65A.01 (2000)).
85. Id.
86. Boston Ins. Co. v. A.H. Jacobson Co., 226 Minn. 479, 483, 33 N.W.2d 602,
604-05 (1948); Cash v. Concordia Fire Ins. Co. of Milwaukee, Wis., 111 Minn. 162,
166, 126 N.W. 524, 525 (1910); Mason v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 82 Minn.
336, 339, 85 N.W. 13, 15 (1901).
87. Stein v. Nat’l Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co., 281 Minn. 287, 293, 161
N.W.2d 533, 537 (1968) (stating that “courts will not redraft insurance policies in
order to provide coverage where the plain language of the policy indicates that no
coverage exists”); Hammer v. Investors Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 473 N.W.2d 884,
889 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (stating “unambiguous language will not be construed
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The court held the amendments to the 1895 Act in 1955 did
not change the proof of loss time requirement to a condition
89
precedent. It noted a past holding where failure to submit to
examination under oath before suing under a maintenance clause
90
did not require dismissal. The court reasoned that the change in
91
92
the clause from “forthwith” to “60 days” provided specific
language so there would be no factual dispute in determining a
93
94
reasonable time for the submission of a proof of loss. The court
noted that the legislature has the power to change the proof of loss
95
clause to a condition precedent, but has failed to do so.
Finally, the court examined the differences in American
96
National’s policy and the standard fire insurance policy. The
court noted that American National’s policy requires the proof of
97
loss to be submitted within sixty days after it is requested. Under
American National’s policy, the insurer can choose to pay on a
claim without requesting a sworn proof of loss, which the court
98
noted indicates the clause is a condition subsequent to recovery.
The standard fire insurance policy requires the proof of loss to be

in a manner more favorable to finding coverage”); see supra note 25 (discussing
Minnesota holdings at common law). In addition to Minnesota courts, many other
jurisdictions have held specific language in a policy can make a proof of loss clause
a condition precedent. Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Nilsen, 745 So.2d 264, 267 (Ala.
1998); Elberton Cotton Mills v. Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 145 A. 33, 35 (Conn.
1929); Yeo v. State Farm Ins. Co., 555 N.W.2d 893, 895 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996);
Commodore Int’l., Ltd. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 591
N.Y.S.2d 168, 170 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 856 S.W.2d
706, 708-09 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992); Keith v. Allstate Indem. Co., 19 P.3d 1077,
1079 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
88. See Act of Apr. 18, 1955, ch. 482, § 1, 1955 Minn. Laws 751 (codified in
MINN. STAT. § 65A.01 (2000)).
89. Nathe Bros., Inc. v. Am. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co., 615 N.W.2d 341, 347 (Minn.
2000).
90. McCullough v. Travelers Cos., 424 N.W.2d 542, 545 (Minn. 1988).
91. See Act of Apr. 25, 1895, ch. 175, § 53, 1895 Minn. Laws 392 (codified at
MINN. STAT. § 65A.01 (2000)).
92. See Act of Apr. 18, 1955, ch. 482, § 1, 1955 Minn. Laws 751 (codified in
MINN. STAT. § 65A.01 (2000)).
93. Farrell v. Neb. Indem. Co., 183 Minn. 65, 67, 235 N.W. 612, 613 (1931)
(stating “a reasonable time will vary in each case raising issues of certainty”).
94. Nathe, 615 N.W.2d at 347.
95. See infra Part IV.B. (discussing the legislature’s opportunities to change
the proof of loss requirement to a condition precedent, but making no such
change).
96. Nathe, 615 N.W.2d at 348.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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99

submitted within sixty days of the loss. The court noted that
American National’s policy did not have specific language in the
100
policy to change the clause to a condition precedent.
Thus, the court concluded that the proof of loss clause in
American National’s policy, and under the statute, is a condition
subsequent, and failure to comply with the clause will not
101
necessarily bar recovery on a policy.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE NATHE DECISION
The court in Nathe had an opportunity to further clarify
102
specifically the
Minnesota’s Standard Fire Insurance Policy,
function of the proof of loss clause. The court used this
opportunity to develop a clear and fair rule; simultaneously it
affirmed a long-standing judicial policy employed in every state,
103
which disfavors forfeiture clauses in insurance contracts.
99. MINN. STAT. § 65A.01, subd. 3 (2000).
100. Nathe, 615 N.W.2d at 348.
101. Id. at 348-49.
102. MINN. STAT. § 65A.01 (2000).
103. McMaster v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 183 U.S. 25, 40 (1901); Amerisure Ins. Co.
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 582 So.2d 1100, 1102 (Ala. 1991); U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Colver,
600 P.2d 1, 3 (Alaska 1979); N. British & Mercantile Ins. Co. v. San Francisco Secs.
Corp., 249 P. 761, 762 (Ariz. 1926); Fed. Life Ins. Co. v. Pearrow, 86 S.W.2d 1106,
1108 (Ark. 1935); Page v. Wash. Mut. Life Ass’n, 125 P.2d 20, 23 (Cal. 1942);
Columbian Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. McClain, 174 P.2d 348, 350 (Colo. 1946); Lee v.
Cas. Co. of Am., 96 A. 952, 954 (Conn. 1916); Brooks Transp. Co. v. Merch’s Mut.
Cas. Co., 171 A. 207, 213 (Del. Super. Ct. 1933); Provident Life Ins. Co. v. Grant,
31 A.2d 885, 887 (D.C. 1943); Infinity Yachts, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 655 So.2d 1259, 1261 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); James v. Pa. Gen. Ins. Co., 306
S.E.2d 422, 425 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983); Hurtig v. Terminix Wood Treating &
Contracting Co., 692 P.2d 1153, 1154 (Haw. 1984); Abbie Uriguen Oldsmobile
Buick, Inc. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 511 P.2d 783, 789 (Idaho 1973); Mack v. Liverpool
& London & Globe Ins. Co., 160 N.E. 222, 225 (Ill. 1928); Modern Woodmen of
Am. v. Hall, 130 N.E. 849, 850 (Ind. 1921); Crowe v. Merch’s Life & Cas. Co., 209
N.W. 406, 407 (Iowa 1926); Queen Ins. Co. of Am. v. Excelsior Mill Co., 76 P. 423,
424 (Kan. 1904); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Bryan, 50 S.W.2d 74, 75 (Ky. 1932);
Simmons v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 199 So.2d 421, 424 (La. Ct. App. 1967); Royal Ins.
Co. v. Pinette, 756 A.2d 520, 523 (Me. 2000); McEvoy v. Sec. Fire Ins. Co. of
Baltimore, 73 A. 157, 161 (Md. 1909); Queen v. Vt. Mut. Ins. Co., 589 N.E.2d 325,
328 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992); Ever Krisp Food Prods. Co. v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co.,
61 N.W.2d 172, 175 (Mich. 1953); Wait v. Journeymen Barbers’ Int’l Union of
Am., 210 Minn. 180, 188, 297 N.W. 630, 634 (1941); J & W Foods Corp. v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 723 So.2d 550, 552 (Miss. 1998); Greer v. Zurich Ins.
Co., 441 S.W.2d 15, 31 (Mo. 1969); Holstrom v. Mut. Ben. Health and Acc. Ass’n,
364 P.2d 1065, 1067 (Mont. 1961); Springfield & Marine Ins. Co. v. McLimans, 45
N.W. 171, 172 (Neb. 1890); Ambassador Ins. Co v. Bozarth, 582 P.2d 798, 799
(Nev. 1978); Weaver v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 674 A.2d 975, 977 (N.H. 1996); Toub
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A. Proof of Loss
The court developed a clear rule to determine the function of
the Minnesota Standard Fire Insurance Policy proof of loss clause
to insurance contracts. This ruling found that under the policy and
the statute, the proof of loss clause operates as an investigative tool
available to insurers to verify facts and compliance with the
104
policy. This tool should help insurers to investigate and prevent
105
fraud on an insurance policy. Since the proof of loss operates as
an investigative tool, it should function as a condition subsequent,
because it is “affecting rights that have already accrued under the
policy and intended not as conditions of liability, but for evidential
106
purposes in enabling the insurer to determine its liability.”
Before the 1955 amendments to the statute, compliance with
the proof of loss time requirement was vital because it operated as

v. Home Indem. Co. of N.Y., 183 A. 827, 829 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1936); King v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 505 P.2d 1226, 1231 (N.M. 1973); Press Pub. Co. v. Gen.
Accident, Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 145 N.Y.S. 711, 713 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st
Dep’t 1914); Smith v. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co., 95 S.E. 562, 564 (N.C. 1918); Kief
Farmers Coop. Elevator Co. v. Farmland Mut. Ins. Co., 534 N.W.2d 28, 32 (N.D.
1995); Westfield Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 650 N.E.2d 112, 116 (Ohio
Ct. App. 3d. 1993); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Union Graded Sch. Dist. No. 73 of
Garvin County, 249 P. 345, 346 (Okla. 1926); Purcell v. Wash. Fid. Nat’l Ins. Co.,
16 P.2d 639, 641 (Or. 1932); Poles v. State Mut. Ben. Soc., 195 A. 429, 431 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1937); Campbell v. Norfolk & Dedham Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 682 A.2d 933,
935 (R.I. 1996); Ward v. Pac. Fire Ins. Co., 104 S.E. 316, 317-18 (S.C. 1920);
Duerksen v. Brookings Int’l Life & Cas. Co., 166 N.W.2d 567, 571 (S.D. 1969);
Satterfield v. Inter-Ocean Cas. Co., 19 S.W.2d 229, 230 (Tenn. 1929); Travelers
Indem. Co. of R.I. v. Lucas, 678 S.W.2d 732, 734 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984); Moran v.
Knights of Columbus, 151 P. 353, 360 (Utah 1915); Coop. Fire Ins. Ass’n of Vt. v.
Bizon, 693 A.2d 722, 727 (Vt. 1997); Williams v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 123 S.E. 509,
512 (Va. 1924); Frye v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 288 P. 262, 264 (Wash. 1930);
Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co. v. McMahon & Sons, Inc., 356 S.E.2d 488, 496 (W.Va. 1987); W.
Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Budrus, 332 N.W.2d 837, 839 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983); Wilson v.
Witt, 952 P.2d 214, 216 (Wyo. 1998).
104. Nathe, 615 N.W.2d at 348.
105. See generally 13 LEE R. RUSS ET AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE § 186:8 (3d ed.
1999) (stating “the proof of loss requirement is designed to give the insurer facts
to facilitate its investigation”). See also Vala v. Pac. Ins. Co., Ltd., 695 N.E.2d 581,
586 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (stating “the purpose of a proof of loss is to allow the
insurer to form an intelligent estimate of its rights and liabilities, to afford it an
opportunity for investigation and to prevent fraud and imposition upon it”); Clark
v. London Assur. Corp., 195 P. 809, 812 (Nev. 1921) (stating “one of the purposes
—in fact, the chief one—of requiring the proof of loss is to prevent imposition
and fraud”).
106. Boston Ins. Co. v. A.H. Jacobson Co., 226 Minn. 479, 483, 33 N.W.2d 602,
605 (1948).
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107

the initial notice to the insurer. The initial notice requirement
108
has a different function than the proof of loss requirement. The
initial notice requirement operates as a tool for the insurer to
109
begin a timely investigation.
The initial notice requirement
should operate as a condition precedent, because it is the first time
an insurer learns of the loss and in order to conduct an adequate
110
investigation the insurer must have early notice of the loss.
The legislature noted the differences in the functions of the
two clauses and the importance of the initial notice of the loss by
making that time requirement immediate, thereby separating it
111
from the proof of loss requirement. In Nathe the court noted that
“the legislature was quite clear that notice was now required to be
immediate” when it separated the notice and proof of loss
112
requirements.
The court noted that this immediate notice
113
protects the insurer’s interests by giving the insurer “ample
opportunity to investigate into the cause of the fire and the nature
114
and extent of the loss.”
The court noted that American National’s use of the proof of
loss clause supported the view that the clause operates as an
115
investigative tool. American National did not that request Nathe
Brothers submit a proof of loss unless it disagreed with the initial
116
$10,000 adjustment.
Furthermore, American National could
choose to pay on a claim without ever requesting a sworn proof of
107. Nathe Bros., Inc. v. Am. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co., 615 N.W.2d 341, 346 (Minn.
2000). See Fletcher v. German-Am. Ins. Co., 79 Minn. 337, 341, 82 N.W. 647, 648
(1900) (stating “one of the objects in requiring forthwith proof of loss is to give
the insurer ample opportunity to investigate the cause and the extent of the loss”).
108. 13 LEE R. RUSS ET AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE § 186:8 (3d ed. 1999) (stating
“notice of the accident serves a different purpose than the proof of loss . . . [as]
[t]he proof of loss requirement is designed to give the insurer facts to facilitate its
investigation as opposed to notice to commence a timely investigation”).
109. Id.
110. 13 LEE R. RUSS ET AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE § 186:14 (3d ed. 1999)
(stating “that the purpose of a provision for notice of loss is to afford the insurer
an adequate opportunity to investigate, to prevent fraud and imposition upon it,
and to form an intelligent estimate of its rights and liabilities before it is obliged to
pay”).
111. See Act of Apr. 18, 1955, ch. 482, § 1, 1955 Minn. Laws 755 (codified in
MINN. STAT. § 65A.01, subd. 3 (2000)).
112. Nathe, 615 N.W.2d at 348.
113. Id.
114. Fletcher v. German-Am. Ins. Co. of New York, 79 Minn. 337, 341, 82 N.W.
647, 648 (1900).
115. Nathe, 615 N.W.2d at 348.
116. Id. at 343.
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loss from Nathe Brothers or any customer American National
117
insured. By its actions, American National indicated that the
submission of a sworn proof of loss is not a condition precedent to
118
its liability, but a condition subsequent to recovery.
By noting the function of the proof of loss and showing how,
by its actions, American National used the proof of loss, the court
clarified the current function of the clause in this case and in the
119
statute.
B. Condition Subsequent v. Condition Precedent
This decision provided further certainty to the Minnesota
statute by holding the proof of loss clause acts as a condition
120
subsequent. Had the supreme court sustained the lower court’s
ruling, it would be in conflict with its holding in McCullough v.
121
Travelers Cos., where the Court held that failure to submit to an
examination prior to bringing suit did not require dismissal of the
122
insured’s suit.
In this case, McCullough’s restaurant was destroyed by a gas
123
McCullough submitted a proof of loss
explosion and fire.
124
statement to Travelers Companies.
Travelers Companies
demanded an oral examination of McCullough pursuant to a policy
provision that requires the insured to submit to examinations
125
under oath upon Travelers’ Companies demand. When the
examination could not be scheduled and several months passed,
McCullough served a summons and complaint on Travelers
126
Companies. Travelers Companies answered that McCullough’s
suit was barred because he had refused to comply with the policy
provision requiring him to submit to an oral examination under
127
oath. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
128
Travelers Companies, and the appellate court affirmed. The
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 348.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 348-49.
424 N.W.2d 542 (Minn. 1988).
Id. at 545.
Id. at 543.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 544.
Id.
Id. at 544.
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supreme court reversed and remanded the case stating “under this
policy, and oral examination under oath is not a condition
129
precedent to suit.” The court in McCullough further stated that
the suit would not be barred because “the policy merely states that
130
no suit will be sustainable.” The court contrasted this holding
from a situation that would void the policy where an insured
fraudulently conceals or misrepresents information during an
131
insurer’s investigation.
132
One could argue that the 1955 amendments specifically
133
added language changing the clause to a condition precedent.
However, this argument fails because the court addressed the
maintenance of suit clause in McCullough, when it stated that a
“failure to submit to examination is not fatal to the insured’s suit
where, as here, the insured has not expressly refused to submit to
an examination and has expressed a willingness to be examined
134
shortly after commencing suit.” The legislature has amended the
1895 statute on numerous occasions, and each time it had an
opportunity to change the proof of loss clause to a condition
135
precedent. However, the legislature has not changed the proof of
136
loss clause, as it remains a condition subsequent. Furthermore,
courts have made suggestions to the legislature on several
129. Id. at 544.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 545.
132. See Act of Apr. 18, 1955, ch. 482, § 1, 1955 Minn. Laws 751 (codified in
MINN. STAT. § 65A.01 (2000)).
133. See generally Nathe Bros., Inc. v. Am. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co., 597 N.W.2d 587,
589-590 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999), overruled by Nathe Bros., Inc. v. Am. Nat’l Fire Ins.
Co., 615 N.W.2d 341 (Minn. 2000) (discussing that the Minnesota Standard Fire
Insurance Policy compels the conclusion that the insured must provide a signed
and sworn proof of loss within sixty days of the insurer’s request; however this
argument was overruled by the Minnesota Supreme Court). See also Accord
Yaccarino v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 542 N.Y.S.2d 660, 661 (N.Y. App. Div.
1989) (stating “that the failure to timely file a proof of loss statement constitutes
an absolute defense to an action to recover the proceeds of an insurance policy”).
134. McCullough, 424 N.W.2d at 545. Addressing the McCullough decision, the
court in Nathe stated “[o]ur holding in McCullough makes it clear that the addition
of the maintenance of suit clause to the Standard Fire Insurance Policy did not
make strict compliance with all its terms a condition precedent to recovery.” Nathe,
615 N.W.2d at 347.
135. See Act of Apr. 18, 1955, ch. 482, § 1, 1955 Minn. Laws 751 (codified in
MINN. STAT. § 65A.01 (2000)) (amending the 1895 statute in 1955, but the
legislature did not change the timeliness requirement of proof of loss to a
condition precedent); McCullough, 424 N.W.2d at 545 (finding the maintenance of
suit amendments to the 1955 statute to be a condition subsequent).
136. MINN. STAT. § 65A.01 (2000).
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occasions, providing express language the legislature should use if
137
it wished to change the clause to a condition precedent. It
appears that the legislature wishes the proof of loss clause to
remain a condition subsequent, as it has not used its opportunities
or suggestions from the court to change the clause to a condition
138
precedent.
The court in Nathe noted that absent specific policy language
139
the clause is a condition subsequent. This leaves insurers free to
change the proof of loss clause to a condition precedent in their
140
own policies.
American National failed to add this specific
141
language to their policy.
Furthermore, there was no claim of fraudulent concealment,
142
misrepresentation, or bad faith in this case. Nathe Brothers
attempted to adhere to the policy by submitting an incomplete
143
proof of loss form, and subsequently submitting a complete proof
144
of loss form. If the Nathe Brothers did commit fraud, when
137. Boston Ins. Co. v. A.H. Jacobson Co., 226 Minn. 479, 483, 33 N.W.2d 602,
605 (1948) (discussing a forfeiture of the insured’s rights must be provided in the
policy for a court to construe a policy as providing a forfeiture; however, in this
case the statute prescribing the form of policy does not provide a forfeiture);
Mason v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 82 Minn. 336, 338, 85 N.W. 13, 14 (1901)
(discussing that the legislature can provide express language amending the 1895
statute such as the failure to comply with the timeliness requirement would be
“fatal to the rights of the insured, or a condition precedent to the liability of the
company”).
138. MINN. STAT. § 65A.01 (2000).
139. Nathe, 615 N.W.2d at 348.
140. 2 LEE R. RUSS ET AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE § 22:34 (3d rev. ed. 1995)
(stating “in the absence of a contrary statute, forfeiture provisions are valid . . .
[and] courts will enforce a forfeiture where there has been a plain violation of a
condition of the policy and it is the clearly expressed intent of the parties that
forfeiture be the consequences of such a violation”); see infra note 63 (discussing
recent Minnesota decisions holding specific language in an insurance policy
constitutes a condition precedent; further discussing similar findings in other
jurisdictions). However, a proof of loss clause drafted as a complete bar to
recovery in Minnesota is a penalty to rights already vested in the insured, and is
against long-standing judicial policy disfavoring forfeiture clauses in insurance
contracts and should not be allowed. Boston Ins. Co. v. A.H. Jacobson Co., 226
Minn. 479, 483, 33 N.W.2d 602, 605 (1948) (stating “the proof of loss time
requirement in the Minnesota statute is a condition subsequent because it affects
rights that have already accrued”); see supra note 103 (discussing long-standing
judicial policy disfavoring forfeiture clauses in insurance contracts).
141. Nathe, 615 N.W.2d at 348.
142. See generally Nathe Bros., Inc. v. Am. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co., 615 N.W.2d 341
(Minn. 2000).
143. Id. at 343.
144. Id.
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145

submitting a proof of loss, the fraud can void the policy, because
the essential function of a proof of loss clause is a tool that the
insurer can use to investigate a claim and prevent fraud on the
146
policy.
The court properly ruled the proof of loss requirement is a
147
condition subsequent under the statute and in this situation.
Courts in other jurisdictions have come to similar conclusions while
148
determining the function of a proof of loss clause.
V. CONCLUSION
The Nathe decision correctly determined that the submission
of proof of loss in this situation (and under the statute) is a
condition subsequent and failure to meet that time requirement
149
should not necessarily bar recovery. This ruling enhances the
view that courts should interpret ambiguities in a manner that
150
maintains the insured’s rights under the policy. The legislature
has had ample opportunity to change the proof of loss clause to a
condition precedent in the statute, but has made no such change.
In overruling an erroneous court of appeals decision, the supreme
court has made the current Minnesota Standard Fire Insurance
Policy and Minnesota’s insurance law more certain.

145. 5 LEE R. RUSS ET AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE § 79:66 (3d ed. 1996).
146. See supra note 105.
147. Nathe, 615 N.W.2d at 348-49.
148. See supra note 105 (finding cases discussing the function of a proof of loss
clause); see also Elberton Cotton Mills v. Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 145 A. 33, 35
(Conn. 1929); Himelfarb v. Harford Fire Ins. Co., 718 A.2d 693, 700 (Md. 1998);
Keene Co-op. Grain & Supply Co. v. Farmers Union Indus. Mut. Ins. Co., 128
N.W.2d 773, 778 (Neb. 1964); Clark v. London Assur. Corp., 195 P. 809, 812 (Nev.
1921).
149. Nathe, 615 N.W.2d at 348.
150. See supra note 1.

